Yulong Cao
Yulong Cao is a computer scientist whose work tests the security of autonomous-driving perception and studies models that reason about road scenes. He earned B.S. degrees from the University of Michigan and Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2017; his computer science and engineering Ph.D. at Michigan was advised by Morley Mao. His research spans LiDAR spoofing and removal attacks, adversarial trajectory prediction, and driving models such as Dolphins and Alpamayo-R1. As of October 2026, he is a research scientist in NVIDIA's ASPIRE Group, led by Marco Pavone, with interests in trustworthy AI, alignment, and embodied AI systems.
Timeline
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2017
Michigan and Shanghai degrees
In 2017, he earns B.S. degrees from the University of Michigan and Shanghai Jiao Tong University. At Michigan, his computer science and engineering Ph.D. is advised by Morley Mao.
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2019
A LiDAR spoofing attack
In 2019, he leads the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in autonomous vehicles in the labs of Z. Morley Mao and Kevin Fu at the University of Michigan. The team spoofs obstacles in front of a victim vehicle with about 75% success; its paper, “Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving,” is presented at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security in November 2019.
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2020
LiDAR security and public research
In March 2020, he and Mao write for Popular Science about the University of Michigan's RobustNet Research Group LiDAR work. In 2020, he, Jiachen Sun, Qi Alfred Chen and Z. Morley Mao present a USENIX Security paper showing that ignored occlusion patterns in LiDAR point clouds make self-driving cars vulnerable to spoofing. Their black-box attack reaches about 80% mean success, and the CARLO defense cuts the rate to 5.5%.
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2022
Adversarial trajectory prediction
In 2022, he is first author of AdvDO, an ECCV paper on realistic adversarial attacks for trajectory prediction. In another 2022 paper, he is first author of Robust Trajectory Prediction against Adversarial Attacks, selected for oral presentation at CoRL with Marco Pavone among the coauthors.
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2023
Physical removal attacks
In 2023, he coauthors “You Can't See Me: Physical Removal Attacks on LiDAR-based Autonomous Vehicles Driving Frameworks.” In moving-vehicle scenarios, the attacks remove 90% of a target obstacle's cloud points with a 92.7% success rate.
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2023–2024
Dolphins for conversational driving
In December 2023, he coauthors Dolphins with Yingzi Ma, Jiachen Sun, Marco Pavone and Chaowei Xiao. The model builds on OpenFlamingo and adds a Grounded Chain of Thought process to serve as a conversational driving assistant; its paper appears at ECCV in 2024.
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October 2025–January 2026
Alpamayo-R1 for autonomous driving
In October 2025, he is one of 42 NVIDIA authors of Alpamayo-R1, a vision-language-action model that combines Chain of Causation reasoning with trajectory planning for complex driving scenarios. On-vehicle road tests report real-time performance at 99 ms latency, and the January 2026 revision lists him as an author.
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As of October 2026
Research scientist in ASPIRE
As of October 2026, he is a research scientist in NVIDIA's Autonomous Systems and Physical AI Research (ASPIRE) Group, led by Marco Pavone. His research interests include trustworthy AI, alignment and embodied AI systems.
Career
- NowNVIDIAResearch Scientist
Education
- 2017University of MichiganB.S.
- 2017Shanghai Jiao Tong UniversityB.S.
Sources and credits
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- Yulong Cao | NVIDIA ASPIRE Group
- Adversarial Sensor Attack on LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving
- New attack on autonomous vehicle sensors creates fake obstacles
- Self-driving cars still have major perception problems | Popular Science
- Towards Robust LiDAR-based Perception in Autonomous Driving: General Black-box Adversarial Sensor Attack and Countermeasures | USENIX
- AdvDO: Realistic Adversarial Attacks for Trajectory Prediction | NVIDIA Research
- Robust Trajectory Prediction against Adversarial Attacks
- You Can't See Me: Physical Removal Attacks on LiDAR-based Autonomous Vehicles Driving Frameworks | USENIX
- Dolphins: Multimodal Language Model for Driving
- ECCV Poster: Dolphins: Multimodal Language Model for Driving
- Alpamayo-R1: Bridging Reasoning and Action Prediction for Generalizable Autonomous Driving in the Long Tail
- Yulong Cao
